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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the effect of bank’s revenue diversification across different 
activities on the stock-based return and risk measures using data on the Japanese banking sector. In 
the analyses, we measure non-interest income share as a measure for revenue diversification of 
banks. These analyses confirm the positive effect of revenue diversification by increasing 
non-interest income share on the franchise values of banks, while there is no strong evidence that it 
reduce bank risks. In contrast, when non-interest income is broken down into its constituent 
parts—fee income, trading income and other non-interest income—we find that a shift toward fee 
income-generating business decreases all types of risks (systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, and total 
risk). Furthermore, we find that the effects of bank’s revenue diversification on franchise value and 
risks are contingent on organizational forms and performance of traditional banking business.  
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1. Introduction 
Should banks be diversified across various activities such as commercial banking, securities 
underwriting, insurance, brokerage, and fiduciary services? As a result of worldwide deregulation, 
technological changes, and developments in product markets, the question of focus versus 
diversification in the banking industry has gained in importance for bank managers, shareholders, 
regulators, and financial economists. Although a number of studies have attempted to shed light on 
the effect of diversification on bank performance, they have provided mixed results. For example, 
whereas Baele et al. (2007) demonstrate that diversification increases bank franchise values and 
decreases idiosyncratic risks among European banks, Leaven and Levine (2007) find a 
diversification discount in financial conglomerates based on cross-country data. Moreover, Stiroh 
and Rumble (2006) show that although U.S. financial holding companies can benefit from 
diversification, these benefits are offset by an increase in exposure to highly volatile non-interest 
income business.  
In addition to mixed findings in the previous literature, studies that use stock market data to 
comprehensively assess the effect of functional diversification on both return and risk are limited. To 
date, only Stiroh (2006) and Baele et al. (2007), which respectively explore the American and 
European banking systems, utilize stock market data to this end. These studies use share of 
non-interest income as a proxy measure for functional or revenue diversification. As stated in Stiroh 
(2006) and Baele et al. (2007), stock market measures for return and risk have some relative 
advantages over accounting data. First, in stock market data, equity prices are forward-looking and 
therefore allow for the prediction of prospective performance and risks associated with different 
strategic choices. Second, the use of stock market data allows for the decomposition of total risk into 
systematic and idiosyncratic components. This distinction provides useful information for bank 
stakeholders because they are often interested in different types of risks faced by the bank. For 
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instance, investors with sufficiently diversified portfolios are principally interested in systematic 
risks to bank equity returns. On the other hand, large shareholders, bank managers, and supervisors 
also pay attention to idiosyncratic and total risks.  
This paper comprehensively examines the effect of revenue diversification of Japanese banks 
on stock-based performance and risk measures (i.e., systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk). 
In the analyses, similar to previous studies, this study employs measures based on non-interest 
income in bank revenue structure to gauge revenue diversification. Further, to explicitly investigate 
which activities the market evaluates as beneficial to bank performance and risk, we estimate the 
respective effects of fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income by decomposing 
non-interest income share. In addition, we account for the possibility of non-linearity that the effects 
of revenue diversification on franchise value or risk measures are affected by organizational form of 
banks and their performances in traditional banking business, because it is considered that banks that 
perform well in traditional banking business can more effectively implement their revenue 
diversification than those banks that perform badly. In addition, Yamori et al. (2003) confirm that 
Japanese banks affiliated with bank holding companies (BHCs) are more profit-efficient than are 
independent banks. Therefore, it is plausible that BHC organizations may implement revenue 
diversification more efficiently than do independent banking organizations. To explore these 
possibilities, this paper explicitly examines whether the effects of banks’ revenue diversification on 
their stock-based return and risk measures are more beneficial to BHC organizations or banks 
performed better in traditional banking business, compared to independent banking organizations or 
banks performed badly.  
Our analyses reveal that the non-interest income share increases the franchise values of banks, 
while there is no strong evidence that it reduces stock-based risk measures for bank risk (systematic 
risk, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk). When non-interest income is decomposed into its three 
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component sources (fee income, trading income, and other non-interest income), we find that banks 
are able to decrease all types of risk measures by raising fee income share. Finally, we confirm that 
(a) the positive effect of revenue diversification on franchise value of banks is more pronounced for 
BHC organizations than for independent banking organizations and (b) the negative effects of 
revenue diversification on stock-based risk measures are more pronounced for banks performed 
better in traditional banking business than banks performed badly.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the three ways. First, while previous studies 
have focused on only whether revenue diversification or functional diversification improves firm 
value and the riskiness of banks, this paper includes additional analyses related to the possibility that 
the effect of revenue diversification on firm value and the riskiness of banks may be dependent on 
particular bank characteristics such as its organizational form and performance in traditional banking 
business. Second, this paper redresses the deficiencies in the literature that have resulted from the 
exclusive use of American and European banks as data 1 . Specifically, studies that have 
comprehensively assessed the effect of revenue diversification on both return and risk using stock 
market data are limited to Stiroh (2006), which use U.S. banking system data, and Baele et al. (2007), 
which use European banking system data. In this paper, we focus on the Japanese banking system 
and conduct comprehensive analyses on the effect of bank’s revenue diversification on stock-based 
return and risk measures. We utilize the Japanese banking system because it is well known as 
bank-centered financial system, which can affect potential benefits of bank diversification. For 
instance, because Japanese households have preferred to hold more deposits than other financial 
assets compared to households in other developed countries, Japanese banks have built a strong 
customer base through their depository services (see Hoshi and Kashyap 1999). Therefore, Japanese 
                                                  
1
 Work by Berger et al. (2010) is an exception, but it is based on accounting data rather than stock 
market data.  
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banks are more likely to succeed in selling a wide array of financial products to a variety of 
customers. Furthermore, Japanese banks have close ties with their client firms, which can facilitate 
their entry into the investment banking business. On the other hand, the Japanese banking system has 
undergone rapid deregulation since the 1990s. As a consequence, many banks have implemented 
functional diversification in the last decade, shifting toward securities underwriting, insurance, 
brokerage, and fiduciary services. As a result, in this paper, we test the potential benefits of revenue 
diversification in a bank-centered financial system by using recent data from the Japanese banking 
system. 
Third, relative to previous studies that have used stock market data to assess the effect of 
revenue diversification on both return and risk (see Stiroh 2006 and Baele et al. 2007), we spend 
considerably greater effort on investigating a potential endogeneity problem. Specifically, we 
consider the possibility of endogeneity between diversification measures and return or risk measures 
by estimating a regression model with fixed effects and instrumental variables (IV). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
related literature and discusses the expected effect of bank diversification. Section 3 describes the 
institutional background of the Japanese banking system in terms of bank diversification. Section 4 
discusses the data and samples used in this study. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology. 
Section 6 presents the main empirical results. Section 7 presents the results of robustness checks. 
Section 8 summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
2. Related literature and expected effect of bank diversification 
In this section, we review past research that has explored the impact of activity diversification 
on firm value and the risks that banks face. Functionally diversified banks, which engage in 
commercial banking, securities underwriting, insurance, brokerage, fiduciary activities, and other 
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financial services, may enjoy economies of scale. That is, bank profitability can improve if the 
sharing of human capital, information, and technologies generates synergies through integration. 
Further, banks could allocate their resources more efficiently through internal capital markets 
generated by conglomerates (Stein 1997). Conversely, functional diversification could aggravate 
agency problems between corporate insiders and outsiders, between the head office and divisional 
managers, and between the various divisions of conglomerates (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Rajan et 
al. 2000; Stein 2002; etc.). For instance, managers may expand the range of activities in which a 
bank engages to extract private benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The agency costs generated by 
conglomeration weaken the performance of functionally diversified banks or financial 
conglomerates. As a result, the effect of functional diversification on bank performance is 
inconclusive.  
Similar to the inconclusiveness in the theoretical literature, there has been no consensus in the 
empirical literature, which has primarily used data from the revenue structures of banks as an 
indicator for functional diversification. Leaven and Levine (2007), Schmid and Walter (2009), and 
Berger et al. (2010) respectively use cross-country data, data from American banks, and data from 
Chinese banks to reveal diversification discounts in financial conglomerates or diversified banks. 
However, some studies have provided evidence for diversification premiums based on data from the 
European financial system (Vander and Vennet 2002; Baele et al. 2007) and large banks from nine 
developed countries (Elsas et al. 2010).  
According to standard portfolio theory, the effect of functional diversification on bank risk is 
less clear. For instance, if the magnitude of volatility of cash flow generated by non-traditional 
banking activities is higher (lower) than that of cash flow generated by traditional banking activities, 
the shift toward non-banking activities has the effect of increasing (decreasing) the total risk of 
banks. On the other hand, if the correlation between cash flow generated by non-banking activities 
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and that generated by traditional banking activities is low enough, the shift toward non-banking 
activities has the effect of lowering the total risk of banks. Hence, the total effect of the shift toward 
non-banking activities on the total risk of banks is dependent on the magnitudes of these two effects. 
In addition, when total risk is decomposed into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, the effect of 
functional diversification on both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk is also unclear ex ante. For 
instance, if the cash flow generated by non-banking activities is completely correlated (uncorrelated) 
with the return on market portfolio, the shift toward non-banking activities is expected to increase 
(decrease) the systematic risk of banks.  
Empirically, Stiroh (2006) uses stock market data for American bank holding companies to 
confirm that while banks that are more dependent on non-interest income do not enjoy higher equity 
returns, the volatility of their equity returns (in terms of total risk and idiosyncratic risk) and market 
beta (systematic risk) is greater than that of banks that are less dependent on non-interest income. 
Using stock market data for European banks, Baele et al. (2007) find that functional diversification 
increases market value. Furthermore, they show that it increases systematic risk but decreases 
idiosyncratic risk2.  
 
3. Bank diversification and institutional background in Japan 
Japanese banks were principally prohibited from entering other financial sectors for a long 
                                                  
2
 There are some studies related to functional or revenue diversification in Japanese banks. Sawada 
and Yasuda (2010), for example, examine the effect of a bank’s entry into the securities business, 
using the events of bank acquisitions of stakes in security firms. They find that while abnormal 
returns in banks do not significantly differ from zero, returns in security firms are statistically 
positive. Tachibana and Hatakeda (2009) use data from Japanese banks to investigate the effect of 
revenue and loan diversification on bank performance. However, our paper differs from Tachibana 
and Hatakeda (2009) in several ways. First, the measures for bank performance used in their study 
are based on accounting data (i.e., ROA and the standard deviation of ROA). Second, they focus 
only on regional banks. Third, their analyses are based on banks’ single-entity financial statements 
rather than consolidated financial statements. Fourth, they do not explicitly consider the possibility 
of endogeneity between diversification measures and return or risk measures.  
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time, beginning in the post-war period. Since the 1990s, however, deregulation of the financial 
sector progressed rapidly. In 1993, the Financial System Reform Law allowed banks, trust banks, 
and securities companies to partially enter each other’s sectors through subsidiaries. Thus, this law 
allowed commercial banks to engage in the securities business (with the exception of equities-related 
business) through their securities subsidiaries. Because of these changes, commercial banks have 
rapidly increased their respective market shares, particularly in the field of domestic bond 
underwriting (Konishi 2002).  
In 1997, efforts to liberalize the financial market and financial sector led to the 
commencement of the “big bang” financial reform in Japan. As a result of this reform, financial 
holdings (i.e., banks, securities companies, insurance companies, and trust companies) have been 
permitted in Japan since 1998. Additionally, restrictions levied on banks’ securities subsidiaries were 
completely abolished in 1999. Deregulation further led large city banks to establish holding 
company-based financial groups (bank holding companies) after the early 2000s3. By operating 
commercial banks, trust banks, securities companies, consumer finance companies, and other 
financial service companies as subsidiaries, these bank holding companies have provided 
comprehensive financial services to their customers. By the mid-2000s, regional banks had begun to 
actively enter into the securities business by establishing securities subsidiaries or acquiring regional 
securities companies. Furthermore, over-the-counter sales of investment trusts and insurance 
products by banks were allowed4 and have generated an increasing amount of fee income for banks 
since 2001 (Inaba and Hattori 2006).5 
                                                  
3
 In the case when banks entered insurance business, bank holding companies had been permitted to 
have only failed insurance companies as subsidiaries until September 2000. 
4
 Over-the-counter sales of investment trusts by banks have been allowed since December 1998. 
Over-the-counter sales of insurance products have been partially allowed since April 2001 and 
completely allowed since December 2007. 
5
 Inaba and Hottori (2006) investigate the movement of fee income-generating business in Japanese 
banks, based on unconsolidated financial statements. They find that although there exists a positive 
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4. Data and samples  
This paper uses data on publicly traded banks (independent banks) and bank holding 
companies (financial groups with subsidiary banks) from 1999 to 2011. With respect to bank holding 
companies (BHCs), since we select only those companies which are classified as banking industry, 
their consolidated financial statement are based on common bank accounting system. Therefore, it is 
possible to compare independent banks and bank holding companies directly. Sample independent 
banks are composed by commercial and trust banks, and sample BHCs have at least a commercial or 
a trust bank as their subsidiaries. We chose this sample period because of the availability of 
consolidated financial statements, which are needed to capture the effect of the functional 
diversification of banks. Although the Japanese corporate accounting system was reformed in the 
late 1990s and has been based on consolidated accounting rather than single accounting since March 
2000, the consolidated accounting system was introduced into the Japanese banking industry in 
March 1999. The sample period also includes different business cycles and stock market conditions. 
The data on consolidated financial statements and the stock market are taken from the Nikkei 
NEEDS–Financial Quest. 
To obtain data from the stock market, we use daily stock returns, we exclude banks for which 
more than 20% of trading days within a year have missing data6. For banks that have merged with 
other banks, we remove the data for the point in time immediately following the merger to resolve 
any issues arising from data discontinuity. For BHCs, we use only the top-tiered entity to avoid 
double-counting the same activity. That is, publicly traded banks that are subsidiaries of BHCs are 
excluded from the sample. The final sample consists of 113 banks and BHCs that yielded 991 
bank-year observations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between interest income and fee income in the 1990s, it does not hold after 2001.    
6
 The empirical results are rarely changed if we make the criterion more stringent, although the 
number of observation decreases. 
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5. Methodology  
5.1 Performance and risk measure 
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of bank’s revenue diversification on 
performance and riskiness using stock market data. To do this, we use Tobin’s Q as a stock-based 
measure of performance. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the present value of a bank’s future cash 
flows to the replacement cost of its assets. It has thus been used in previous research as a proxy for a 
firm’s franchise value or long-term performance (e.g., Keeley 1990; Lang and Stulz 1994). In the 
following analyses, we use the sum of market value of equity and the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of assets (market-to-book ratio) as the Q ratio.  
To gauge bank risk, we utilize three types of market-based risk measures: total risk, systematic 
risk, and idiosyncratic risk. To obtain these measures, we estimate the following market model with 
two indexes. 
Rit = αi + βit Rmt + γ1 It + uit,                                      (1) 
where Rit indicates the daily stock return of bank i at time t and Rmt is the return on the stock market 
index at time t. We use the Tokyo Stock Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) as the proxy for the market 
index. It represents the change of a default-free debt index on t. The Nikkei JGB Index, which 
indicates the weighted-average yield of 10-year Japanese government bonds, is used as the proxy for 
the default-free debt index. We estimate equation (1) for each year and bank. Here, βit is a measure 
of the bank’s systematic risk. Further, we use the standard deviation of (a) the bank stock returns and 
(b) the residuals estimate in equation (1) as measures for total risk and idiosyncratic risk, 
respectively.  
 
5.2 Diversification measures 
To measure functional diversification, this paper focuses on a bank’s revenue structure. We 
11 
 
primarily utilize the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income (non-interest income 
share) on the gross basis7. We use “ordinary income” in Japanese bank accounting as total operating 
income, according to the definition of the Japanese Bankers Association8. The non-interest income 
share is expected to capture non-traditional banking business. Considering the possibility that the 
effect of non-interest income share is not monotonous, we add its quadratic term in explanatory 
variables. Furthermore, we decompose non-interest income share into its constituent parts: fee 
income, trading income, and other non-interest income shares. The details of this decomposition and 
revenue categories are shown in Appendix 1 (A.1.). We also use these shares in the regression 
analysis to investigate how each factor among non-interest income share affects franchise value and 
risk measures. We also employ a complementary measure of bank diversification that has been 
characterized as revenue diversity in previous studies (Baele et al. 2007; Laeven and Levine 2007; 
Elsas et al. 2010). This measure is defined as  
 
|
income Operating Total
 incomeinterest -Non    incomeInterest | 1=diversity Revenue －−    (2) 
 
In this equation, revenue diversity takes on its maximum value (1) when non-interest income share is 
0.5 and its minimum value (0) when non-interest income share is zero or one. This measure is 
similar to the HHI-type measures used in Stiroh and Rumble (2006). 
Figure 1 presents the annual mean of the non-interest share and revenue diversity for the sample 
banks. Non-interest share and revenue diversity demonstrated similar trends, culminating with 
matching peaks in 2006. In Figure 2, non-interest income share is broken down into fee income, 
                                                  
7
 In this paper, we focus not on the net income structures of banks, but on the gross income 
structures, to ensure that the diversification measure will not be unduly distorted by their cost 
structures. 
8
 We follow the definition of the Japanese Bankers Association at “http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/ 
banks/financial_statement/” 
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trading income, and other non-interest income shares. Fee income share gradually increases until 
2007, which may reflect banks’ tendencies to enter into new businesses (e.g., insurance sales and 
investment trust products).  
 
5.3 Specification 
To explore the effect of bank diversification on risk and franchise value, we estimate the 
following equation: 
itiitit YEARXDIV εηϕγαα ++′+′++= ・・・21itY ,                   (3) 
where Yit is bank franchise value (Tobin’s Q) or market-based risk measures (market beta, 
idiosyncratic risk, and total risk). DIV denotes the revenue diversification measures defined above. X 
denotes the vector of other control variables. These include the equity-to-asset ratio, cost-to-income 
ratio, non-performing loan ratio (bad loan ratio), loan growth rate, log of total assets (bank size), and 
returns on asset (ROA). The equity-to-asset ratio measures bank capital structure, which could affect 
bank franchise value and risks in several ways, for example, agency cost, financial leverage, or a 
buffer to negative shocks. Hence, the effects of bank capital structure on franchise value and risks 
are less clear in advance.  
The cost-to-income ratio measures cost inefficiency, which is expected to affect the franchise 
value of banks negatively. The non-performing loan ratio represents the quality of loans that banks 
offer. Non-performing loans are referred to as risk management loans, which include loans to 
debtors in legal bankruptcy, past-due loans, loans in arrears by three months or more, and 
restructured loans. The non-performing loan ratio is expected to be negatively correlated with the 
franchise value of banks and positively correlated with risk measures. Loan growth rate is expected 
to have a positive (negative) relationship with franchise value (risk measures) if the stock market 
evaluates it as performance of a traditional banking business. In contrast, it is possible that loan 
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growth rate may have positive effect on risk measures if the stock market evaluates it as an increase 
in their assets’ credit risk. The measure for returns on assets (ROA) captures current profitability of 
banks. While bank profitability is expected to be positively related with franchise value, its effect on 
bank risk is less clear in advance.  
In addition to the financial variables outlined above, we also include the year dummy 
variables, Year to control for macro-level shocks and unobserved time heterogeneity. iη indicates 
individual fixed effects. It is important to control individual effects because of the possibility of 
endogeneity between diversification measures and return or risk measures. For example, 
firm-specific characteristics like management ability or geographic location may affect bank 
performance or risk, and the decision to diversify (Campa and Kedia 2002; Stiroh and Rumble 2006). 
To control these individual effects, we estimate equation (3) with the within-effect model.9 The 
explanatory variables are principally lagged one year to mitigate potential simultaneity. However, 
with respect to loan growth rate, we use its value in the same time with the dependent variables, 
because to calculate the one year lagged value of loan growth rate, we need the information on both 
one- and two- year lagged values of the outstanding amount of loans.10 However, the estimate 
results do not change, even if we exclude it from the explanatory variables. The robust-standard 
errors clustered at the bank level are used. 
So far it has been implicitly assumed that the effects of bank’s revenue diversification on 
franchise value or risks are same across all banks. However, it is possible that some banks are more 
adept at managing revenue diversification across different activities than other banks. Therefore, we 
explore the possibility that the effects of revenue diversification may be affected by particular bank 
                                                  
9
 The sole consideration of individual effects may be insufficient for controlling endogeneity 
between diversification measures and return or risk measures. To account for this, we also estimate 
the equation with instrument variables in the section 7.  
10
 If the loan growth rate for explanatory variables is lagged by one year, the sample size decreases 
because information related to the values of loans’ outstanding amounts in the consolidated financial 
statement is not available before year 1998. 
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characteristics. Firstly, we focus on organizational forms of banks as these characteristics, because 
using data from Japanese regional banks, Yamori et al. (2003) confirm that banks affiliated with 
BHC are more profit-efficient than independent banks. Yamori et al.(2003) has suggested that that 
Japanese banks affiliated with bank holding companies (BHCs) are more profit-efficient than are 
independent banks. Therefore, it is possible that BHCs will implement revenue diversification 
derived from their activities in securities, insurance, and fiduciary business more efficiently than 
independent banking companies will. To investigate whether banks’ organizational forms influence 
the effects of revenue diversification on firm value or risk measures, we perform additional 
estimations by including an interaction term of non-interest income share with a dummy variable 
that indicates whether a firm is in the form of a BHC (one) or as an independent banking company 
(zero). The sole effect of the BHC dummy variable is absorbed by the individual effect outlined in 
equation (3). 
Secondary, we consider performance in traditional banking business such as bank 
characteristics which could affect the effect of revenue diversification, because it is considered that 
banks performed well in traditional banking business such lending business can more effectively 
implement their revenue diversification than those banks performed badly. To test this possibility, we 
also include interaction terms of non-interest income share with the variables for performance in 
traditional banking business (i.e., loan growth rate and bad loan ratio) in explanatory variables. 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively display the basic statistics and correlation matrix associated with the 
main variables of this study. 
 
6. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents the results estimated from equation (3) using the franchise value (Tobin’s Q) 
as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of non-interest income share is 
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positive and statistically significant, which indicates that banks which raise their share of 
non-interest income likewise increase their franchise values. In Column 2, we add ROA, which 
serves as an accounting measure for current profitability of banks, in explanatory variables. The 
analysis confirms that the coefficient of non-interest income share is positive and statistically 
significant, even when controlling for ROA. As demonstrated in Column 3, the coefficient of the 
quadratic term for non-interest income share is not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that the relationship between non-interest income share and franchise value is non-linear. 
In Column 4, non-interest income share is decomposed into fee income, trading income, and other 
non-interest income shares. We find that both fee income and trading income shares positively 
influence bank franchise value. Column 5 shows that the coefficient of revenue diversity is also 
positive and statistically significant. To summarize, the stock market positively evaluates banks’ 
revenue diversification or increased dependence on non-interest income.  
These results are consistent with Baele et al. (2007), who investigate the case of European 
banks.11 Baele et al. (2007) point out that since European banks have longer experience diversifying 
their activities and have devoted adequate management resources to non-banking activities, the stock 
market highly evaluates their diversification of activities. Japanese banks, by comparison, do not 
have extensive experience with functional diversification. However, they have established a stronger 
customer base in the bank-centered financial system than non-banking financial institutions.12 
Therefore, stock market investors may expect that functional diversification would be more 
beneficial to Japanese banks than their counterparts in other financial systems.  
In Columns 6-8, we add interaction terms of non-interest income share with the variables that 
                                                  
11
 On the other hand, these results are contrast with Laeven and Levine (2007) who found a 
diversification discount for banks in 43 counties. 
12
 Japanese banks have long maintained close ties with their client firms, called the main bank 
system. In addition, because Japanese households prefer to hold more deposits than other financial 
assets, they have obtained ample funds (Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard 1994; Hoshi and Kashyap 1999). 
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indicate organizational forms and performance in traditional banking business (i.e., the BHC dummy 
variable, bad loan ratio and loan growth ratio). Column 6 indicates that the coefficient of the 
interaction terms of non-interest income share with the BHC dummy is positive and statistically 
significant (p < .05). This signals that the positive effect of revenue diversification on bank franchise 
value is more pronounced for BHC organizations than independent banking organizations. This 
result demonstrates that a bank’s organizational form affects the impact of a bank’s revenue 
diversification on franchise value.13 Columns 7 and 8 demonstrate that the coefficients of the 
interaction terms of non-interest income share with measures for accounting performance in 
traditional banking activities (loan growth rate and bad loan ratio) were not statistically significant. 
As a result, there is no evidence to suggest the impact of revenue diversification on bank’s franchise 
value is increasing on its performance in traditional banking business.  
Other control variables are considered as well. It is generally found that bank size, capital 
structure, cost efficiency, and loan quality do not significantly affect bank franchise value. The 
coefficient for loan growth rate is positive and statistically significant in most cases. This result 
indicates that the stock market positively evaluates banks that perform better in terms of their 
traditional banking business. ROA’s coefficient is similarly positive and statistically significant in all 
cases. This indicates that current profitability positive influences bank franchise values. 
Table 4 summarizes the results estimated with total risk as the dependent variable. Column 1 
shows that the coefficient of non-interest income share is marginally negative (p < .10), suggesting 
that banks which increase their non-interest income share decrease their total risk. Column 3 
illustrates that the coefficients of fee income and trading income are both significantly negative. The 
                                                  
13
 To explore whether bank size affects the effect of revenue diversification on franchise value, we 
perform another regression that included an interaction term between non-interest income share and 
bank size; this interaction term was not statistically significant. Therefore, organizational form is 
considered to be an important factor rather than bank size. 
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more pronounced effect of fee income on total risk is likely due to the expectation that fee income 
became a stable source of bank revenue as a result of the deregulations in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Column 2 confirms the inverse U-shaped relationship between non-interest income share and 
total risk. Our calculations reveal that total risk is maximized at a non-interest income share of 
25.7%, which approximately corresponds to the 30th percentile. 
To explore the reasons for the inverse U-shaped relationship described above, although not 
reported in the table, we compare the average fee-income share for banks with a high share of 
non-interest income (i.e., more than 30th percentile) with those with low share of non-interest 
income (i.e., less than 30th percentile). We find that whereas the mean (median) of the fee-income 
share for banks with a high share of non-interest income was 12.3% (12.0%), that of banks with low 
share of non-interest income is 11.0% (10.9%). The difference between the two samples was 
statistically significant (p < .01). This result demonstrates that banks with a high share of 
non-interest income can reap greater reward from it by raising the share of fee income. In turn, this 
may generate the observed inverse U-shaped relationship between non-interest income share and 
total risk. Column 4 illustrates that revenue diversity does not have a significant effect on total risk.  
In Columns 5-7, we add the interaction terms of non-interest income share with the variables 
for organizational form and performance in traditional banking. In Column 5, the coefficient of the 
interaction term of non-interest income share with the BHC dummy is negative, but not statistically 
significant. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that organizational forms of banks affect the 
effect of revenue diversification on their total risks. Column 6 includes interaction term of 
non-interest income share with loan growth rate, and its coefficient is not statistically significant. In 
contrast, Column 7 which contains the coefficient of the interaction term of non-interest income 
share with bad loan ratio is positive and statistically significant (p < .01). This result suggests that 
the risk-reducing effect of non-interest income share on total risk is greater for banks with a lower 
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credit risk on their loans. While not shown here, our calculation reveals that when the bad loan ratio 
of a bank is greater than 10.6% (93th percentile), the negative effect of non-interest income share on 
idiosyncratic risk can be completely offset by the interaction effect. Therefore, at least, Japanese 
banks hardly increase their idiosyncratic risks by raising their non-interest income shares.14 One 
interpretation of this result is that banks that are better equipped to manage credit risk of their loans 
may also be better prepared to handle changes in total risks accompanied by revenue diversification.  
For other control variables, we find that equity-asset ratios have significant, negative effects on 
the total risk of banks, which suggests that banks that increase their leverages likewise increase their 
total risks. The coefficients of other control variables (i.e., bank size, cost-to-income ratio, bad loan 
ratio, loan growth rate, and ROA) are generally non-significant, although most of them displayed 
expected signs.  
Next, we split total risk into idiosyncratic component and systematic component (market beta). 
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimated results of our analyses that employ idiosyncratic risk and market 
beta as the respective dependent variables. Column 1 in Table 5 shows that the coefficient of 
non-interest income share is negative, but not statistically significant. This suggests that banks are 
generally unable to decrease their idiosyncratic risks by raising their non-interest income shares. 
Column 2 summarizes the results of the non-linearity test. While the coefficient of non-interest 
income share is not statistically significant, the coefficient of its quadratic term is negative and 
statistically significant (p < .05). As a result of the joint test (which is not reported in the table), we 
confirm that these two coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level. This demonstrates that the 
relationship between non-interest income share and idiosyncratic risk is also inverse U-shaped. 
                                                  
14To quantitatively examine this effect, we also compare the effect of non-interest income share on 
total risk between banks with a higher bad loan ratio (75th percentile = 0.0715) and banks with a 
lower bad loan ratio (25th percentile = 0.0363). This calculation reveals that although the total effect 
of non-interest income share on total risk in the former group of banks is -0.107, the effect in the 
latter group is -0.217, indicating that the risk-reducing effect of non-interest income share in banks 
with a lower bad loan ratio is twice as large as that of banks with a higher bad loan ratio.  
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However, we confirm that for the majority of Japanese banks, the relationship is downward slowing, 
because our calculation reveals that idiosyncratic risk is maximized at a non-interest income share of 
23.7%, which approximately corresponds to the 20th percentile. Column 3 demonstrates that the 
coefficients of trading income share and fee income share are significantly negative. Of particular 
note, the negative relationship between fee income share and idiosyncratic risk is stronger than the 
relationships of other components, which suggests that banks are able to decrease idiosyncratic risk 
by devoting themselves to the fee-based business. Stock market investors may expect that fee 
income will represent a stable source of bank revenue as a result of the series of deregulations in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Column 4 confirms that that revenue diversity does not significantly 
affect idiosyncratic risk.  
In Columns 5-7, we add the interaction terms of non-interest income share with the variables 
for organizational form and performance in traditional banking. The analyses associated with these 
columns produce qualitatively similar results to those that evaluated total risk (Table 4). Specifically, 
the coefficients of the interaction terms of non-interest income share with the BHC dummy and loan 
growth rate are not statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction term of 
non-interest income share with a bank’s bad loan ratio is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that the negative effect of non-interest income share on idiosyncratic risk is contingent upon 
the quality of bank loans. Banks with lower loan credit risk can decrease their idiosyncratic risks by 
increasing their non-interest income shares, while those with higher loan credit risk are generally 
unable to mitigate their idiosyncratic risks.15 Therefore, the benefit of revenue diversification seems 
greater for banks that are better equipped to manage the credit risk of their loans. 
                                                  
15
 The estimated coefficients imply that, when bad loan ratio of a bank is more than 10.6 % (93th 
percentile), the negative effect of non-interest income share on idiosyncratic risk is completely offset 
by the interaction effect between non-interest income share and bad loan ratio. At least, banks hardly 
increase their idiosyncratic risks by raising their non-interest income shares. 
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As for other control variables, the coefficient of equity-asset ratio is negative and significant 
in all cases. Similarly, the coefficient of the cost-to-income ratio is consistently significantly positive. 
An increase in a bank’s leverage and cost inefficiency tends to increase their idiosyncratic risks. In 
addition, ROA is universally shown to have a significant negative relationship with idiosyncratic risk, 
indicating that the more profitable a bank is, the lower its idiosyncratic risk. Loan growth rate is also 
negatively associated with idiosyncratic risk in some cases. Given the estimated effects of ROA and 
loan growth rate, we surmise that lower performance of banks will tend to increase their 
idiosyncratic risks.  
Table 6 summarizes the results of the estimation that use the market beta (systematic risk) as 
the dependent variable. In Column 1, the coefficient of non-interest income share is negative, but 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that banks are generally unable to decrease their systematic 
risk by increasing their share of non-interest income. Column 2 demonstrates an inverse U-shaped 
relation between non-interest income share and systematic risk. Our calculation determines that 
market beta is maximized when the bank’s non-interest income share is 28.7%, which approximately 
corresponds to the 40th percentile. As a result, the positive and negative relationships appear to be 
mixed, which yields a non-significant test of linearity for non-interest income share as confirmed in 
Column 1. Column 3 demonstrates that banks with a higher share of fee income have lower 
systematic risks. Therefore, the stock market may anticipate that the correlation between the return 
on market portfolio and fee income will be relatively low relative to other revenue sources. This is 
likely that the result of the expectation that fee income will become a stable source of bank revenue 
as a result of the above-described deregulations.16 Column 4 shows that revenue diversity does not 
                                                  
16
 We actually calculate the ex post correlation between the annual return on market portfolio and 
the annual growth rate of each revenue category. We find that the correlation between the return on 
market portfolio and the growth of fee income (ρ = 0.170) is lower than that between the return on 
market portfolio and the growth of interest income (ρ = 0.301) in the first half of the period (2000–
2006). On the other hand, the former (ρ = 0.339) is higher than the latter (ρ = –0319) in the second 
 
21 
 
have a significant effect on beta.  
In Columns 5-7, we add the interaction terms of non-interest income share and with the 
variables for organizational form and performance in traditional banking. Whereas the coefficients 
for the interaction term of non-interest income share with the BHC dummy is not statistically 
significant, the coefficients for the interaction terms of non-interest income share with loan growth 
rate and bad loan ratio are significantly positive (p < .01). This indicates that banks that perform well 
in traditional banking business can more effectively mitigate their systematic risk than those banks 
that perform badly by raising their non-interest income shares. Further, our calculations confirm that 
most banks do not exacerbate their systematic risks by increasing their non-interest income shares.17  
These analyses also reveal that the coefficient of the equity-asset ratio is negative and 
statistically significant in all cases, which indicates that an increase in leverage of banks tends to 
increase their systematic risks. Contrarily, the coefficients for other control variables (i.e., bank size, 
cost efficiency, loan growth rate and bad loan ratio, and ROA) are not statistically significant in most 
cases. As a result, there is no evidence that these control variables affect a bank’s systematic risk.  
  
7. Robustness checks 
In this study, we considered the possibility of endogeneity between the diversification measures 
and return or risk measures. As described in section 5.3, to mitigate the endogeneity associated with 
unobserved heterogeneity, this paper employs within-effects model. Although this strategy may limit 
                                                                                                                                                 
half of the period (2007–2011). The negative correlation between the return on market portfolio and 
the growth of interest income may reflect that the amount of bank lending hardly decreased due to 
the policies of the Japanese government (such as capital injections or the emergency credit guarantee 
program) during the crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers, although the stock market collapsed 
and the real economy slowed down.  
17
 The estimated coefficients imply that when the bad loan ratio of a bank is greater than 7.57 % 
(78th percentile) and loan growth rate is less than -4.0 % (9th percentile), the negative effect of 
non-interest income share on systematic risk is completely offset by the interaction effect. Therefore 
Japanese banks hardly increase their systematic risks by raising their non-interest income shares. 
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the likelihood of endogeneity in some cases, it may not be sufficient to control other types of 
endogeneity (e.g., reverse causality). Therefore, we also use instrumental variable regressions to 
control endogeneity more explicitly. Consistent with the work of Elsas et al. (2010), we use the 
variables for the diversification measures lagged with one more year as instruments. In doing so, we 
incorporate a two–year lag between return or risk measures (dependent variables) and diversification 
measures because explanatory variables have been already lagged for one year. 
In spite of these steps, the lagged diversification measures may not be completely exogenous. 
Therefore, we consider additional instrumental variables associated with regulatory changes. For 
example, in almost every year since 1997, Japanese banks have faced various types of deregulations 
associated directly or indirectly with functional diversification or financial conglomerates. These 
regulatory changes are considered to be exogenous to bank operations. However, since all Japanese 
banks are faced with the same regulatory changes, it is difficult to directly use the variable for 
regulatory changes as instruments.18 Therefore, we focus on the bank reactions to those regulatory 
changes. More specifically, we consider banks’ reactions to the regulatory changes to be different 
among bank types, since business strategy or customer needs vary greatly between them. The 
differences in bank reactions by type are expected to indirectly affect return or risk through the 
non-interest income shares. Therefore, these divergent reactions can be used as instruments. In the 
estimation, we use the interaction terms between the dummy variable for year and the variable for 
the types of banks as instrumental variables because it is unclear in advance how the different types 
of banks would react to different types of deregulation. Bank size is used as a proxy for type of 
banks.19  
                                                  
18
 The effect of each regulatory change is absorbed by year dummy variables. 
19
 Furthermore, when we replace bank size with a dummy variable indicating bank category, (i.e., 
bank holding companies, city banks, trust banks, and regional banks) as a proxy for type of bank, we 
obtain the qualitatively similar results to those summarized in Table 7. 
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The results estimated for two-stage least squares regressions with instrumental variables are 
reported in Table 7. In the first step, we regress the measures for diversification on instrumental 
variables and other control variables. In the second step, we regress franchise value or risk measures 
on the fitted values from first stage and other control variables. In the odd columns (1,3,5 and 7), the 
non-interest income share is instrumented, and in the even columns (2,4,6 and 8) the fee income, 
trading income, and other non-interest income shares are instrumented in the first stage. We use 
Tobin’s Q (franchise value) as the dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2. Column 1 shows that the 
coefficient on non-interest income share is positive and statistically significant (p < .01), which 
indicates that the positive effect of non-interest income share on a bank’s franchise value of banks is 
robust even when controlling for endogeneity. Column 2 shows that the statistical significance of the 
positive effect of fee income share disappears, but that of trading income share remains robust.  
The results associated with the risk measures: the estimated results for market beta, 
idiosyncratic risk, and total risk are shown in columns 3–4, 5–6, and 7–8, respectively. Columns 3, 5, 
and 7 illustrate that non-interest income share does not significantly affect any of the risk measures 
(market beta, idiosyncratic risk, and total risk). In contrast, the results of Columns 4, 6, and 8 show 
that the coefficients on fee income share are significantly negative (p < .01) for all risk measures. 
These results suggest that an increase in fee income share reduces all types of bank risks, even when 
controlling for endogeneity. Previous results (Tables 3-6) coupled with the results of the instrumental 
variables regressions (Table 7) provide strong evidence that revenue diversification by increasing 
non-interest income share increases their franchise value. However, there is no strong evidence to 
suggest that it reduce their risks. Furthermore, these results provide robust evidence that an increase 
in fee income share reduces all risk measures for banks. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper empirically investigates whether banks actually derive benefit from revenue 
diversification across different activities. Specifically, we examine the effects of bank’s revenue 
diversification on firm value and risk using stock market data. Our analyses focus on the Japanese 
banking sector, which is well known as a bank-centered financial system. This paper also explores 
the possibility that the effect of revenue diversification may be contingent upon organizational form 
or performance in traditional banking business. 
In the analyses, we find a positive effect of revenue diversification on a bank’s franchise value, 
by using non-interest income share as a measure for revenue diversification. Because Japanese banks 
have established a strong customer base and close ties with their client firms, stock market investors 
may anticipate that revenue diversification would be more beneficial for Japanese banks. In contrast, 
we can not obtain strong evidence to suggest that non-interest income share decreases bank risk. 
However, banks are found to be able to decrease all types of risks (i.e., systematic, idiosyncratic, and 
total risk) by raising fee income share. Because of a series of deregulation measures in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, stock market investors are likely to expect that fee-based income will become a 
more stable source of bank revenue than trading income and other non-interest income. The results 
reported here suggest that revenue diversification by increasing non-interest income share is 
beneficial to most stakeholders in the Japanese banking industry because it increases franchise value 
without increasing risk. In particular, a shift toward fee income-generating activities seems to be 
particularly desirable in terms of decreasing total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risk. However, in the 
future, when Japanese banks expend the benefits derived from various deregulations, fee-based 
business is likely to be more competitive among banks. Therefore, future research can benefit from a 
consideration of a longer time span. 
   We also find that the positive effect of revenue diversification on the franchise value of banks is 
25 
 
more pronounced for BHC organizations than for independent banking organizations. We further 
find that the risk-reducing effects of revenue diversification are greater for banks with lower loan 
credit risk than banks with higher loan credit risk. This implies that banks that have better skills to 
manage the credit risk of their loans are likewise equipped to handle the change in their risks that 
comes with revenue diversification. As such, these results may provide bank regulators or 
supervisors with important insights about how they should change or improve the regulations related 
to bank diversifications or financial conglomerates in the future because our observations suggest 
that the effects of bank’s revenue diversification on franchise value and risk measures are affected by 
particular bank characteristics such as organizational form and performance of traditional banking 
business. Deeper investigations of the variables that affect the relationship between revenue 
diversification and bank’s return or risk would therefore pose an interesting and fruitful avenue for 
future research.  
 
 
Appendix 
A.1. Revenue categories 
The measures for revenue diversification are based on consolidated financial statements. We 
use ordinary income in Japanese bank accounting as total operating income, according to the 
definition of the Japanese Bankers Association. In consolidated financial statements, total operating 
income (ordinary incomes) is composed of six items of account: (a) interest income, (b) fees and 
commissions, (c) trading revenue, (d) other operating income, (e) other income, and (f) commissions 
from trust accounts20.  
                                                  
20
 The item “other operating income (d)” is composed of the six sub-item accounts: gain on foreign 
exchange transactions (d1), gain on trading account securities transactions (d2), gain on sales of 
bonds (d3) and redemption of bonds (d4), income from derivatives other than for trading or hedging 
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(b) scommission and fees= Income  Fee•  
securitiesother  and stocks of saleson gain                                          
(d) income operatingother  (c) revenue trading= Income Trading
+
+•
 
Income Trading-Income  Fee-Incomet Noninteres=Incomet NoninteresOther •  
 
where the item “gain on sales of stocks and other securities” in trading income is actually 
unavailable in consolidated accounts because it is included in the item of other income (e). Therefore, 
we substitute the value of “gain on sales of stocks and other securities” in unconsolidated 
(single-entity) accounts of banks to calculate the value of trading income21. With respect to financial 
groups with multiple subsidiary banks, we calculate the values of financial groups by adding up the 
values of their subsidiary banks.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance and risk measures
Tobin's Q (Franchise Value) 991 0.9937 0.0206 0.9450 1.1638
Market beta 991 0.8061 0.3607 -0.0813 2.3129
Idiosyncratic risk 991 0.2751 0.0978 0.0928 0.9042
Total risk 991 0.3353 0.1128 0.0950 0.9126
Measures for revenue diversification
Non-interest income share 991 0.3116 0.0967 0.1007 0.7637
Fee income share 991 0.1191 0.0443 0.0318 0.2977
Trading income share 991 0.1402 0.0948 0.0035 0.5696
Other non-interest income share 991 0.0523 0.0640 0.0018 0.3886
Revenue diversity 991 0.6066 0.1571 0.2014 0.9986
Other control variables
Bank size 991 14.9819 1.0301 13.2962 19.1342
Equity-to-assets  991 0.0482 0.0134 0.0011 0.1210
Cost-to-income 991 0.9622 0.2388 0.5823 2.4727
Bad loan ratio (B/L) 991 0.0577 0.0314 0.0099 0.3540
Loan growth rate 991 0.0056 0.0396 -0.2190 0.2303
Profitability (ROA) 991 0.0049 0.0052 -0.0247 0.0558
Table2 Correlation Matrix 
Panel A Correlation matrix of main variables
Variables NIS RD FI TI ONI Size E/A C/I B/L LG ROA
Non-interest income share (NIS) 1.0000
Revenue diversity (RD) 0.8633 1.0000
Fee income share (FI) 0.1635 0.1651 1.0000
Trading income share (TI) 0.6837 0.5963 -0.2697 1.0000
Other non-interest income share(ONI) 0.3857 0.3074 -0.0456 -0.2606 1.0000
Bank size 0.4195 0.3712 0.2473 0.2933 0.0286 1.0000
Equity-to-assets  (E/A) 0.0397 0.0173 0.0841 0.1113 -0.1630 0.0234 1.0000
Cost-to-income (C/I) -0.0838 -0.0985 -0.2193 -0.0376 0.0807 -0.0656 -0.4674 1.0000
Bad loan ratio (B/L) -0.0040 -0.0428 -0.2058 -0.0212 0.1676 -0.2228 -0.2956 0.4802 1.0000
Loan growth rate(LG) 0.0922 0.0536 0.2194 -0.0336 0.0373 -0.0298 0.2729 -0.3974 -0.2885 1.0000
Profitability (ROA) 0.0413 0.0260 0.0149 -0.0052 0.0598 0.0970 -0.1657 0.6682 0.3175 -0.1539 1.0000
Panel B Correlation matrix of main variables after within-transformation
Variables NIS RD FI TI ONI Size E/A C/I B/L LG ROA
Non-interest income share (NIS) 1.0000
Revenue diversity (RD) 0.7719 1.0000
Fee income share (FI) 0.1659 0.1938 1.0000
Trading income share (TI) 0.7499 0.5126 -0.3367 1.0000
Other non-interest income share(ONI) 0.1651 0.1951 -0.0619 -0.2934 1.0000
Bank size 0.1306 0.1185 0.3039 0.0390 -0.1615 1.0000
Equity-to-assets  (E/A) 0.1430 0.1216 0.3911 -0.0732 0.0031 0.1403 1.0000
Cost-to-income (C/I) -0.2764 -0.2107 -0.2975 -0.0962 -0.0051 -0.1451 -0.5697 1.0000
Bad loan ratio (B/L) -0.0503 -0.0058 -0.3071 0.0171 0.2014 -0.4103 -0.2932 0.3931 1.0000
Loan growth rate (LG) 0.2164 0.1260 0.3405 -0.0057 0.0572 0.0782 0.3698 -0.3500 -0.1852 1.0000
Profitability (ROA) -0.1404 -0.0683 0.0439 -0.1540 0.0061 0.0074 -0.2200 0.6697 0.1965 -0.1086 1.0000
Table3 Franchise value regression
Dependent Variable:Tobin's Q (Franchise Value)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
(Revenue Diversification)
Non-interest income share (NIS) 0.0259** 0.0284** 0.0670* 0.0143 0.0266** 0.0108   
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0396) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0171)   
(Non-interest income share)^2 -0.0554                
(0.0625)                
Fee income share 0.0764*                
(0.0442)                
Trading income share 0.0314***                
(0.0119)                
Other non-interest income share 0.0312                
(0.0219)                
Revenue diversity 0.0139**                
(0.0058)                
NIS * Financial Holdings 0.1040**                
(0.0407)                
NIS*Loan growth rate 0.1217                
(0.0805)                
NIS* Bad loan ratio 0.3009   
(0.2005)   
(Control variables)
Bank size -0.0130 -0.0141 -0.0136 -0.0128 -0.0134 -0.0137 -0.0133 -0.0135   
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0106)   
Equity-to-assets  -0.1962 -0.2266 -0.2236 -0.2330 -0.2348 -0.1828 -0.2438 -0.2147   
(0.1909) (0.1862) (0.1880) (0.1835) (0.1883) (0.1718) (0.1847) (0.1894)   
Cost-to-income 0.0023 -0.0079 -0.0076 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0066 -0.0084 -0.0080   
(0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0051)   
Bad loan ratio -0.0536 -0.0515 -0.0549 -0.0418 -0.0554 -0.0535 -0.0476 -0.1554** 
(0.0401) (0.0382) (0.0380) (0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0380) (0.0379) (0.0704)   
Loan growth rate 0.0273** 0.0245* 0.0268* 0.0233* 0.0280* 0.0292** -0.0211 0.0257*  
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0162) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0143) (0.0325) (0.0146)   
ROA 0.5018*** 0.4938*** 0.4712*** 0.4767*** 0.4615*** 0.5036*** 0.5623***
(0.1533) (0.1511) (0.1481) (0.1505) (0.1442) (0.1547) (0.1519)   
Constant 1.1946*** 1.2198*** 1.2064*** 1.1956*** 1.2107*** 1.2117*** 1.2092*** 1.2160***
(0.1620) (0.1650) (0.1603) (0.1580) (0.1595) (0.1592) (0.1650) (0.1593)   
Number of observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 991 991   
R_sq (Within) 0.480 0.490 0.492 0.492 0.490 0.504 0.491 0.493   
Number of groups 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*". The figures in parentheses indicate the standard errors.  Year dummy
variables are included in each regression.
Table4 Total risk regression
Dependent Variable: Total risk 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
(Revenue Diversification)
Non-interest income share (NIS) -0.1481* 0.4129* -0.1171 -0.1395 -0.3310***
(0.0852) (0.2226) (0.0940) (0.0864) (0.1154)   
(Non-interest income share)^2 -0.8041***                
(0.2591)                
Fee income share -0.8498**                
(0.3295)                
Trading income share -0.1893**                
(0.0912)                
Other non-interest income share -0.2308                
(0.1452)                
Revenue diversity 0.0053                
(0.0438)                
NIS * Financial Holdings -0.2294                
(0.1889)                
NIS*Loan growth rate -0.5866                
(0.5740)                
NIS* Bad loan ratio 3.1273***
(1.1555)   
(Control variables)
Bank size -0.0039 0.0031 -0.0241 -0.0103 -0.0047 -0.0077 0.0023   
(0.0586) (0.0581) (0.0670) (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0582) (0.0572)   
Equity-to-assets  -2.2547*** -2.2114*** -2.1619*** -2.1332*** -2.3513*** -2.1717*** -2.1312***
(0.5937) (0.5929) (0.5835) (0.5978) (0.5924) (0.5971) (0.5844)   
Cost-to-income 0.0379 0.0426* 0.0325 0.0417 0.0351 0.0404 0.0367   
(0.0265) (0.0250) (0.0264) (0.0270) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0244)   
Bad loan ratio 0.2121 0.1631 0.0727 0.1848 0.2166 0.1933 -0.8680*  
(0.2534) (0.2508) (0.2421) (0.2550) (0.2558) (0.2536) (0.4519)   
Loan growth rate -0.1000 -0.0670 -0.0806 -0.1150 -0.1102 0.1201 -0.0876   
(0.0850) (0.0799) (0.0829) (0.0904) (0.0851) (0.2227) (0.0752)   
ROA -1.0486 -1.1648 -0.5867 -0.9008 -0.9596 -1.0574 -0.4202   
(0.8788) (0.8216) (0.9396) (0.8982) (0.8783) (0.8689) (0.7610)   
Constant 0.5011 0.3077 0.8746 0.5438 0.5188 0.5520 0.4620   
(0.8852) (0.8841) (1.0214) (0.8729) (0.8686) (0.8802) (0.8588)   
Number of observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 991   
R_sq (Within) 0.500 0.508 0.511 0.496 0.502 0.501 0.507   
Number of groups 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*". The figures in parentheses indicate the standard
errors.  Year dummy variables are included in each regression.
Table5 Idiosyncratic risk regression
Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic risk
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
(Revenue Diversification)
Non-interest income share (NIS) -0.1303 0.2745 -0.1140 -0.1232 -0.2907***
(0.0799) (0.2139) (0.0886) (0.0811) (0.1086)   
(Non-interest income share)^2 -0.5802**                
(0.2520)                
Fee income share -0.7036**                
(0.2836)                
Trading income share -0.1634*                
(0.0835)                
Other non-interest income share -0.2040                
(0.1481)                
Revenue diversity -0.0004                
(0.0414)                
NIS * Financial Holdings -0.1211                
(0.1454)                
NIS*Loan growth rate -0.4864                
(0.4876)                
NIS* Bad loan ratio 2.7413** 
(1.1245)   
(Control variables)
Bank size -0.0232 -0.0182 -0.0398 -0.0286 -0.0236 -0.0263 -0.0178   
(0.0582) (0.0577) (0.0644) (0.0575) (0.0576) (0.0579) (0.0567)   
Equity-to-assets  -2.2785*** -2.2473*** -2.2028*** -2.1767*** -2.3295*** -2.2097*** -2.1702***
(0.5667) (0.5657) (0.5561) (0.5736) (0.5741) (0.5717) (0.5598)   
Cost-to-income 0.0497** 0.0532** 0.0453** 0.0527** 0.0483** 0.0519** 0.0487** 
(0.0228) (0.0218) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0210)   
Bad loan ratio 0.1922 0.1569 0.0786 0.1713 0.1946 0.1766 -0.7546*  
(0.2674) (0.2630) (0.2527) (0.2688) (0.2683) (0.2690) (0.4152)   
Loan growth rate -0.1473* -0.1234 -0.1311 -0.1607* -0.1527* 0.0352 -0.1363*  
(0.0799) (0.0786) (0.0801) (0.0839) (0.0804) (0.2013) (0.0728)   
ROA -1.8139** -1.8978** -1.4346* -1.6850** -1.7669** -1.8212** -1.2631*  
(0.7801) (0.7447) (0.8491) (0.8024) (0.7857) (0.7779) (0.7174)   
Constant 0.7686 0.6290 1.0767 0.8065 0.7780 0.8108 0.7343   
(0.8779) (0.8756) (0.9815) (0.8698) (0.8693) (0.8747) (0.8505)   
Number of observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 991   
R_sq (Within) 0.388 0.394 0.398 0.384 0.389 0.389 0.396   
Number of groups 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*". The figures in parentheses indicate the standard errors.
Year dummy variables are included in each regression.
Table6 Market beta regression
Dependent Variable:Market beta 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
(Revenue Diversification)
Non-interest income share (NIS) -0.2805 1.2875* -0.1696 -0.2056 -1.2327***
(0.1929) (0.6864) (0.1977) (0.1942) (0.2541)   
(Non-interest income share)^2 -2.2476**                
(0.8828)                
Fee income share -1.8220*                
(0.9568)                
Trading income share -0.3629*                
(0.2154)                
Other non-interest income share -0.5498                
(0.3803)                
Revenue diversity 0.0726                
(0.1102)                
NIS * Financial Holdings -0.8219                
(0.9483)                
NIS*Loan growth rate -5.1360***                
(1.6418)                
NIS* Bad loan ratio 16.2811***
(3.7747)   
(Control variables)
Bank size -0.0950 -0.0755 -0.1419 -0.1095 -0.0980 -0.1284 -0.0630   
(0.1769) (0.1731) (0.1980) (0.1778) (0.1741) (0.1764) (0.1613)   
Equity-to-assets  -4.1275** -4.0067** -3.9261** -3.8342** -4.4738** -3.4013* -3.4847*  
(1.8715) (1.8777) (1.8791) (1.8310) (1.8052) (1.9116) (1.7953)   
Cost-to-income 0.0948 0.1081 0.0824 0.1062 0.0849 0.1174 0.0888   
(0.0759) (0.0737) (0.0747) (0.0757) (0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0752)   
Bad loan ratio -0.2480 -0.3849 -0.5499 -0.3379 -0.2318 -0.4126 -5.8711***
(0.5839) (0.6114) (0.5991) (0.6012) (0.5957) (0.5753) (1.3701)   
Loan growth rate -0.1913 -0.0988 -0.1445 -0.2171 -0.2278 1.7360*** -0.1264   
(0.2551) (0.2306) (0.2432) (0.2576) (0.2498) (0.5700) (0.2275)   
ROA -3.3539 -3.6787 -2.3097 -3.0606 -3.0350 -3.4308 -0.0823   
(2.6714) (2.5620) (2.8388) (2.6810) (2.6905) (2.5267) (2.7764)   
Constant 1.9160 1.3753 2.7788 1.9933 1.9795 2.3616 1.7123   
(2.6606) (2.6234) (3.0150) (2.6759) (2.6169) (2.6534) (2.4108)   
Number of observations 991 991 991 991 991 991 991   
R_sq (Within) 0.606 0.612 0.611 0.605 0.608 0.612 0.624   
Number of groups 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*". The figures in parentheses indicate the standard
errors.  Year dummy variables are included in each regression.
Table7 IV estimation
Dependent Variable
Tobin'Q Tobin'Q Beta Beta Idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic Total risk Total risk
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
(Revenue Diversification / Instrumented )
Non-interest revenue share 0.071*** -0.267 -0.153 -0.253                
(0.025) (0.460) (0.143) (0.157)                
Fee income share 0.021 -2.935*** -0.816*** -1.096***
(0.043) (0.786) (0.243) (0.265)   
Trading income share 0.063** -0.030 0.001 -0.116   
(0.028) (0.502) (0.155) (0.169)   
Other non-interest income share 0.056* -0.372 -0.541*** -0.520** 
(0.033) (0.608) (0.188) (0.205)   
(Control variables)
Bank size -0.009 -0.011* -0.125 -0.264** -0.013 -0.068* 0.006 -0.051   
(0.006) (0.007) (0.110) (0.119) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040)   
Equity-to-assets  -0.111 -0.101 -6.067*** -5.099*** -2.770*** -2.560*** -2.802*** -2.515***
(0.072) (0.073) (1.304) (1.340) (0.404) (0.414) (0.446) (0.452)   
Cost-to-income -0.009** -0.009** 0.072 0.062 0.025 0.010 0.010 -0.002   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.070) (0.073) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025)   
Bad loan ratio -0.054* -0.060* -0.688 -1.334** -0.163 -0.373** -0.080 -0.316   
(0.030) (0.031) (0.540) (0.572) (0.167) (0.177) (0.185) (0.193)   
Loan growth rate 0.708*** 0.733*** -1.514 0.691 -0.761 0.419 0.113 1.220   
(0.151) (0.161) (2.733) (2.939) (0.847) (0.908) (0.934) (0.991)   
ROA 0.018 0.020 -0.130 -0.106 -0.187*** -0.164** -0.111 -0.093   
(0.013) (0.013) (0.231) (0.234) (0.072) (0.072) (0.079) (0.079)   
Constant 1.109*** 1.144*** 3.187* 5.588*** 0.604 1.517*** 0.441 1.405** 
(0.092) (0.099) (1.660) (1.812) (0.514) (0.560) (0.567) (0.611)   
Number of observations 891 891 891 891 891 891 891 891   
Number of groups 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Significance at 1%,5% and 10% level are denoted by "***" "**" and "*". The figures in parentheses indicate the standard errors.  Year dummy variables
are included in each regression.
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